

A TROUBLED PAST: The Army and Security on the Mexican Border, 1915–1917

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IN JUNE 2006, the United States dispatched military forces to its southern border to help stem the tide of illegal immigration from Mexico. The tempestuous historical relationship between the United States and Mexico meant that this was hardly the first time the Army went south to effect security along the border. The issues along that frontier have always been complex, and bringing in trained (or untrained) soldiers means inserting them into a very difficult and potentially violent situation. At no time was that made more apparent than in the mid-1910s, when the Army on the border found itself caught up in a mishmash of border security, local violence, guerrilla warfare, racial politics, and state diplomacy.

Background

By the turn of the 20th century, the traditional hostility between the United States and Mexico had cooled, due in no small part to the relative stability afforded Mexico by the long reign of Porfirio Diaz. That peace came at a price: Diaz was a military officer who seized power and ruled as a de facto dictator for most of the years between 1876 and 1911. Mexico began to modernize under the Diaz regime, but his heavy-handed tactics, Mexico's heavy dependence on foreign investment, and the poor condition of the country's lower classes led to a loss of popular support for the aging general. When Diaz backtracked on his promise to step down from power and allow a fair election in 1910, a new revolution and struggle for power began. Among the prominent Mexican leaders who emerged from that struggle were Francisco Madero, Victoriano Huerta, Venustiano Carranza, Francisco "Pancho" Villa, and Emiliano Zapata.¹

The instability created by the Mexican revolution led to an increased Army role on the border. In the spring and summer of 1911, the War Department placed several undermanned Regular Army units near the frontier, based in the towns of San Antonio and Galveston, Texas, and San Diego, California. The troops withdrew in the latter part of the year, but smaller Army units remained and ran patrols along the border to keep an eye on the situation to the south.² In 1913, the War Department reorganized the military in the continental United States into a series of departments and districts. The new Southern Department, headquartered at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, encompassed Louisiana,

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PHOTO: "I've had about enough of this!" –This 1916 cartoon by graphic political commentator Clifford K. Berryman depicts Uncle Sam pursuing Pancho Villa across the U.S.-Mexico border. (NARA)



General Francisco “Pancho” Villa with his general staff, 1913. Villa, fourth from the left, is flanked on his right by General Rodolfo Fierro, Villa’s chief staff. To his left are General Ortega and Colonel Medina.

Arkansas, Oklahoma, and the border states of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. Brigadier General Tasker Bliss became the first commander of the department, and had the unwelcome task of trying to patrol the border with three undermanned cavalry units.³

Across the border, Francisco Madero came to power when he was elected president in 1911, but forces led by General Huerta deposed and murdered the new president the next year. Huerta set up a new dictatorial regime, and Carranza, Villa, and Zapata launched a rebellion against the general. President William Howard Taft, nearing the end of his term in 1913, once again moved troops south to Texas to help stabilize the frontier, but diplomatic events soon overtook this precaution.

The manner of Madero’s removal from power so displeased new American president Woodrow Wilson that he felt compelled to intervene in Mexican affairs. In February 1914, he allowed the shipment of arms to anti-Huerta forces in Mexico. When Mexican Huertista soldiers arrested a group of American sailors at the port city of Tampico in April, Wilson reacted by ordering the bombardment and partial occupation of the city of Veracruz—an occupation that would last until November.⁴ Huerta resigned the presidency under pressure from forces inside and out of Mexico, and Carranza emerged as the most likely candidate for leadership of Mexico.⁵

But even the fall of Huerta did not entirely please President Wilson, who did not formally recognize Carranza as Mexico’s new leader.⁶ Villa and Zapata almost immediately turned against Carranza, which

led to a widespread civil war and the most violent period of the Mexican Revolution. Wilson, hoping for a coalition government in Mexico to prevent any one actor from wielding too much power, did not offer strong support for or opposition against anyone in the conflict. The occupation of Veracruz and Wilson’s picayune objections alienated the Mexican people and their leaders, and helped set the stage for a series of violent disputes along the border between Mexico and the United States.⁷

The Plan of San Diego

Even Diaz’s relatively stable reign had barely concealed the discontent among the people along the border between the United States and Mexico. The conflicts between the two countries involved more than politics at the national level. The shifting frontier meant that Americans and Mexicans with different priorities, loyalties, and prejudices found themselves living side by side. Even though Mexicans and Mexican Americans outnumbered Anglo Americans on and across the border, the Anglo Americans dominated the political and economic landscape. Mexicans and Mexican Americans in these border regions faced the difficult question of how to deal with the institutions and culture of their new neighbors. As one historian has written, they embraced “four basic tactics: withdrawal, accommodation, assimilation, and resistance.”⁸ The majority withdrew, accommodated, or assimilated, but some did resist, and some resisted with violence. As a result, the 19th and early 20th centuries saw the outbreak of countless fights along the border and in the border states.⁹

The Mexican Revolution made the situation worse. Unrest along the border, especially in the Lower Rio Grande, opened the door for lawbreakers to engage in criminal activities, especially livestock rustling. In the first half of 1915, raids and attacks on farms and ranches all along the border increased markedly.¹⁰ But there was more going on than just banditry.

In January, a group of Mexicans and Mexican Americans devised the Plan of San Diego, so-called because it had allegedly originated in the town of San Diego, Texas (although it more likely came from Monterrey, Mexico). The plan called for the reclamation of the southwest United States for Mexico through race war, promising that “every North American over 16 years of age shall be put

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to death, and only the aged men, the women and children shall be respected; and on no account shall the traitors to our race be spared or respected.” Mexicans and Mexican Americans were not to be alone in the fight—the plan counted on an alliance with Indians, African Americans, and Japanese. Once the revolutionaries had achieved victory, they would set up a new independent republic and arrange to create a separate republic for the blacks who participated.¹¹

The creators of the plot had little success in the early part of 1915, and their followers took months to get organized. Two American citizens from the Brownsville, Texas area, Luis de la Rosa and Aniceto Pizaña, played the key role in putting the plan to work. In the early summer of 1915, they went to Mexico and began to recruit troops. They organized the recruits, many of whom had once fought for Carranza, into units of 25 to 100 men and, in July 1915, started launching attacks. At first, the raids looked like a continuation of the earlier, homegrown banditry. As such, the new commander of the Southern Department, Major General Frederick Funston, believed that the responsibility for policing the bandits belonged to the local authorities, not the Army.¹²

The nature of the raids and the raiders indicated why Funston might be so confused. The attacks blended in with criminal activities, and it was unclear who was responsible for anything. The instability in Mexico meant that the leaders who controlled the border regions—Carranza in northeast Mexico and Villa in northwest Mexico—did so only nominally. The Carrancistas along the border with Texas came under the more direct control of General Emiliano Nafarrate, who was not particularly obedient to Carranza. Some of the bandits were Mexican citizens living both in Mexico and the United States; others were Mexican Americans who lived on either side of the border. Some were motivated by revenge against the prejudice of Anglos in the United States. Others acted under orders from

Carrancista officials in Mexico. A few were simply robbers out to make money in the chaos. Historian James Sandos correctly warned against giving any one group total responsibility for the attacks:

The Plan began with followers of Huerta, then was taken over by Germans, who later shared their control with Carranza. But this point must be underscored—the backers did not make the Plan work; they served only as a catalyst. The instability and unpleasantness of border life gave the Plan a semi-independent existence and the backers exploited this situation in rendering support.¹³

As a result of all of this confusion, it took some time before the Army and federal officials recognized the depth of the problem.

The raids picked up in frequency and intensity throughout July. As one historian has written, Plan of San Diego “followers attacked Anglos; attacked symbols of change in the valley such as equipment associated with the railroad, telegraph, automobile and irrigation; and visited reprisals on Mexicans and Tejanos who helped Americans.”¹⁴ On 4 July 1915, roughly 40 Mexican bandits entered the United States and killed 2 men during a raid on a ranch near Lyford, Texas.¹⁵ On 9 July, a foreman of a large ranch killed a bandit in an attack.¹⁶ Historian Charles Cumberland described what happened next:

The following week another raid in the same vicinity emptied a country store and post office; on 17 July marauders killed a youth near Raymondville; and that same night a posse fought a pitched battle with another band. Eight days later, south of Sebastian, raiders numbering approximately 30 burned a bridge; on 31 July, Rancho de los Indios suffered the death of an employee through a raid; on 3 August raiders burned another railroad bridge; and 3 days later, after robbing a store and seizing firearms from individuals, a small band of raiders deliberately executed 2 men.¹⁷

On 3 August, at Los Tulitos Ranch, 18 miles north of Brownsville, troopers from the 12th Cavalry fought a heated battle with 25 to 50 bandits, only to have the Mexicans escape after nightfall.¹⁸ Five days later, 60 raiders attacked the Norias Ranch 70 miles north of the border, which was defended by a

handful of employees and a small detachment from the 12th Cavalry. The defenders held on and killed several Mexicans in the process.¹⁹

As July went into August, U.S. Army commanders and public officials began to recognize that they faced a bigger problem than homegrown criminal stealing or rustling.²⁰ The Plan of San Diego, which had seemed like a fanatical delusion only a few months earlier, now appeared to be gaining momentum. The bandits had broad support in Mexico. Carrancista newspapers throughout the country reprinted the text of the plan and openly encouraged the attacks as a sign of a growing revolution.²¹ Most troubling was the fact that the bandits were clearly using Mexico as a refuge and staging point for the raids. In the raid on the Norias Ranch, the bandits had kidnapped 75-year old Manuel Rincones and forced him to act as a guide. After the battle, Rincones informed the authorities, including General Funston, that about half of the raiders had come from Mexico.²² By 10 August 1915, Funston grasped the problem, "It is impossible for detachments of United States troops when pursuing a particular band of outlaws to deter-

mine whether they are all residents of the United States or whether all or some of them are armed marauding bands who have crossed the border into United States territory." Funston believed that the Army should play a more aggressive role in stopping the raids: "This being the case, I have deemed it my duty to continue using military to pursue and capture these bandits . . . Any other course would render troops practically useless . . . and would limit their activity to the duty of acting as guards for certain localities."²³

Even after Army commanders and national politicians recognized the nature of the difficulty, they were not equipped to respond. Army commanders at every level along the southern border had too few troops to deal with the raids. Brigadier General James Parker, commander of the 1st Cavalry Brigade based at Fort Sam Houston, had to spread 3 cavalry regiments into 16 posts over a 900-mile border. Parker later described his situation:

In view of the 900-miles front, I jocularly claimed that I had the biggest brigade in the world!



Center for American History, UT-Austin

Las Norias Bandit Raid: Las Norias ranch house. (Runyon (Robert) Photograph Collection, RUN00106)

It was composed of 3 regiments—the 2d Cavalry, the 3d Cavalry and the 14th Cavalry.

Each regiment was composed of 12 troops and a machine-gun platoon, numbering about 1,000 men; thus I had about 3,000 men and horses. The detachments along the Rio Grande numbered 16. There were also 30 small camps of patrol detachments or outposts. As there is much heat, dust and alkali water in the desert country along the Rio Grande great hardship was experienced in these camps by both men and horses.

The main camps were some distance from the river. Each maintained two or three outposts of 10 men each near the river, these outposts, by means of small patrols, maintaining communication with each other and with the main camp.²⁴

Despite these vigorous efforts, Parker continued, “it was difficult to prevent the Mexican bandits from breaking through the line of outposts.”²⁵

The specific area where most of the Plan of San Diego raids occurred covered nearly 300 miles of border, and had only 1,100 troops to patrol it, mostly infantry.²⁶ When the 26th Infantry Regiment arrived in Brownsville in August 1915, its commander, Colonel Robert Bullard, found that he had the regiment plus 3 squadrons of cavalry and 2 field artillery batteries to protect an area that stretched along 100 miles of the Rio Grande and 150 miles north of the border.²⁷ With the troops so spread out, all they could do was wait for reports of attacks and try to react as quickly as possible. The bandits had all of the initiative. Funston’s desperation could be seen in a telegram sent to Washington, D.C. on 30 August:

If an uprising should occur without sufficient troops to put it down it will mean the murder of hundreds of defenseless people, the destruction of millions in property and a loss of prestige. These things we cannot afford to risk. The measures I wish to take are largely those of prevention . . . If I do not have an adequate force ready for instant use a single act of indiscretion by a subordinate commander on either side may start a conflagration that will extend along the entire border and result in an international crisis . . . A reference to my official reports

and recommendations will show that I have heretofore been very conservative in regard to calling for more troops largely because I wished to avoid unnecessary expense. The time for economy has passed, more troops should be supplied regardless of expense.²⁸

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—Major General Frederick Funston, 1915

In addition to trying to stop the border raids, the Army had to deal with local authorities and vigilante groups. In the hysteria that followed the raids of July and August, Texas Rangers, local law enforcement, and countless private citizens took it upon themselves to use brutal tactics against anyone, usually Mexican American men, they perceived to be potential bandits. The racial antagonism that helped trigger the violence was described by one early observer: “On one side of the river the slogan was ‘Kill the Gringos’; on the other it was ‘Kill the Greasers.’”²⁹

The Texas Rangers had the ostensible responsibility for keeping order in the state, but a corrupt and inefficient governor had hobbled the organization. Just as the situation on the border grew worse, the force became inexperienced and inept, and Rangers participated and even led attacks against Mexican Americans. In August, civilians in Texas organized the Law and Order League, one of several vigilante groups. These groups confiscated weapons and property, threatened Mexican Americans, and beat, shot, and lynched suspected bandits. In September, one of the groups shot and killed 14 Mexican Americans near Donna, Texas, and left the bodies in a row as a warning to the bandits.³⁰ In October, vigilantes responded to a raid by hanging or shooting 10 “suspicious Mexicans.”³¹ Even conservative estimates put the number of Mexican Americans killed at over 100. Funston estimated that state and local officers “did execute by hanging or shooting approximately 300 suspected Mexicans on [the] American side of [the] river.”³² The violence cleared out the valley. As many as half of the 70,000

residents of the Lower Rio Grande fled in fear of attacks from Mexican bandits or the reprisals of the Anglo Americans.³³ The Army had the responsibility of trying to stop the worst excesses of vigilantes and local law enforcement run amok, all while trying to stop the raids from across the border.

It seemed everything was working against the Army's efforts to catch the raiders. The terrain made it difficult to track the Mexicans, because "despite the large tracts cleared for commercial agriculture most of Cameron and Hidalgo counties had an abundance of chaparral, mesquite thickets, prickly pear and giant cactus."³⁴ Then, in 1915, the Wilson administration forbade the U.S. Army from crossing the border, even to protect American interests in Mexico or in hot pursuit of bandits who had crossed into the United States.³⁵ Historians Charles Harris and Louis Sadler explained how such a policy made the terrain even more favorable to the raiders: "The Rio Grande was a meandering river with banks covered by heavy underbrush, and at the time South Texas was suffering from a severe drought; the flow of the Rio Grande was much reduced, and attackers could pick and choose where to cross into Texas" and, it should be added, back into Mexico.³⁶

Predictably, the border restriction frustrated Army commanders. Funston's predecessor as commander of the Southern Department, General Bliss, had insisted that the only way to ensure border security during the Mexican revolution was to occupy Mexican border towns and create a buffer zone between the countries.³⁷ Army officers on the border, like General Parker, repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction with not being allowed to pursue raiders over the river.³⁸ Even as the raids



Major General Frederick N. Funston

grew worse in July 1915, Funston received a telegram from Washington that explicitly restricted him to reactive tactics:

The War Department realizes perfectly the undesirability from a military standpoint of the restriction that is placed upon you in not giving you permission to cross the Mexican border in case it should become necessary to use force to protect American life and property on the American side of the line. But this restriction is imposed on account

of the necessity of retaining in the hands of the authorities at Washington the final discretion of authorizing a matter of such importance as an invasion of Mexican territory. Under all circumstances the only thing to do is to meet the facts as they arise.³⁹

To make matters worse, more and more reports came in that American outposts, soldiers, and even patrol planes were being fired on from the Mexican side of the river, and Army commanders believed that Mexican Carrancista commanders were not doing anything to stop the attacks.⁴⁰

The War Department did provide Funston with more troops. By September, more than half of the Army's mobile units were stationed between Laredo and Brownsville.⁴¹ Still, the attacks kept coming. On 2 September, a series of assaults hit Brownsville, San Benito, and Ojo de Agua. Between 4 and 6 September, Mexicans and Americans exchanged fire at several crossings along the Rio Grande. The bandits ambushed an Army patrol at Los Indios on 13 September, killing two Americans. On 17 September, the Mexicans and Americans once again exchanged heavy fire over the river, this time at Brownsville. One week later, 80 bandits attacked Progreso and fought a brief but heated battle with the small cavalry detachment in the town. The Mexicans were driven off, but they captured one of the Americans, a Private Richard J. Johnson. At some point during or after their retreat across the river, the raiders killed Johnson, cut off his ears, decapitated him, and put his head on a pike on the south side of the river in full view of the Americans.⁴²

The next few weeks were relatively peaceful. Then, on the night of 18 October, De la Rosa and his

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followers pulled off one of their most spectacular attacks seven miles north of Brownsville at Tandy Station on the St. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico Railroad. There the bandits had removed the spikes holding down the rails and attached a wire to the tracks. As the train approached, they pulled the wire, causing the engine to overturn. The engineer died in the wreck. De la Rosa and his men boarded the train, began looting, and went after the Anglo passengers. They shot three soldiers, killing one, and killed another civilian passenger. The raiders fled the scene and made their way back over the river before the Army or any local posse could catch them.⁴³ Three days later, bandits struck a 15-man Signal Corps detachment at Ojo de Aqua on the Rio Grande. Three Americans and five raiders died in the fight.

The raid at Tandy Station and the attack at Ojo de Aqua pushed Funston to more drastic conclusions. He wrote to the War Department requesting authorization to cross the border in pursuit of the bandits and permission to order no quarter during battles and pursuits. "The American inhabitants of the lower border have about reached the limits of their patience in the matter of the border raids and it will not take many more outrages like the recent wreck of a train and the murder of its defenseless passengers to send them over the border," he wrote. "There is but only one way to end it and that is to make it almost certain death to engage in one of those raids."⁴⁴ The War Department, though sympathetic to Funston's situation, denied these requests, warning Funston that such actions would do more harm than good. Historian Charles Cumberland summarized the War Department's telegram: "The use of the proposed tactics would be disastrous for the military establishment; press sensationalists would seize the opportunity to accuse the Army of lapsing into barbarism and, no matter how true the charges or how great the need, public reaction would be bitter."⁴⁵ The continued raids and Funston's frustrated request made it clear that even with thousands of troops in the lower Rio Grande valley, the Army could not bring order to the frontier region.

Other events stopped the attacks of 1915. By late September, the Americans began to lean toward recognizing Carranza as the de facto leader of Mexico. Several factors influenced this trend. Carranza had

clearly seized the advantage in the fighting and controlled most of Mexico's vital natural resources. The Mexican leader promised to initiate some democratic reforms and to protect American lives and American-owned property in Mexico. President Wilson also desired a more stable situation on the southern border so that he could focus his efforts on the war in Europe. Secretary of State Robert Lansing explained the thinking of the Americans in his diary on 10 October 1915:

Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is forced to intervene; *therefore, we must not intervene.*

Germany does not wish to have any one faction dominant in Mexico; *therefore, we must recognize one faction as dominant in Mexico . . .*

It comes down to this: Our possible relations with Germany must be our first consideration; and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly.⁴⁶

The fact that the Germans repeatedly acted to keep Mexico unstable gave further encouragement to the Wilson administration.⁴⁷ If the United States was to play a larger part in World War I, it would not do to have to worry about fighting an irregular war with Mexican forces in the American southwest. At the same time, Carranza began to act to improve the situation. In late September, he replaced General Nafarrate and ordered Mexican officials to crack down on bandits south of the border.⁴⁸

With those considerations in mind, the unrest created by the low-level insurgency no doubt helped push Wilson toward recognition of Carranza. On 19 October 1915, the Americans officially gave de facto recognition to the "First Chief." On 24 October, the raiders attacked near Tandy Station. It was the last raid of the year. Carrancista officials cracked down or bought off the rest of the followers of the Plan of San Diego. The fact that Carranza could shut down the raids so quickly indicated that he may not have ordered the attacks, but he most likely allowed them and used them to his benefit.⁴⁹

The response of the Army to the border raids of 1915 was haphazard at best. General Funston could not cross the border in pursuit of the bandits and could not control local authorities and vigilantes. The presence of the majority of American troops on the border did not stop the raids, and Funston's

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suggestion that the Army be given a free hand in dealing with bandits only indicated the depth of his frustration. And although the attacks of 1915 had been most frequent in the Lower Rio Grande, that did not mean that the rest of the border was secure. At various times throughout the year, Mexican bandits made raids into all of the border states.⁵⁰ These attacks in 1915 made national politicians and Army officers all too aware of the problem of border instability. When the issue came up again the next year, their experiences led them to try a new solution to the problem that led to more violence and the potential for all-out war.

The Columbus Raid and Punitive Expeditions

By the time the United States decided to recognize Carranza, Pancho Villa's fortunes had long since turned for the worse. A series of military defeats at the hands of Carrancista forces had reduced his army to a ragged, demoralized group. But Villa's base of support had always been in the north, and he assumed that he was invincible in



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A photo titled "In camp near San Antonio, Mexico, with the 6th Infantry." Carrancistas went through here on their way to different points along the railroad in search of Villa and his men, 1916.

the northern states of Chihuahua and Sonora. That confidence led him to attack the Carrancista troops at Agua Prieta in November 1915. He was completely unaware that the Americans had given a few thousand Carrancista troops free passage through southern Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona so that they might reinforce the besieged outpost. Villa's men walked right into a hail of fire. The battle at Agua Prieta and the follow-up campaign scattered what was left of the Villa's army and forced Villa to turn to guerrilla warfare.⁵¹

Up until the events of the summer and fall of 1915, Villa had tried to maintain positive relations with the United States, but his attitude shifted dramatically after Agua Prieta.⁵² That said, the specific motivation for the raid on Columbus, New Mexico, has never been exactly clear—nor has Villa's actual role in planning and executing the attack.⁵³ What is clear is that on 9 March 1916, Villa led a force of nearly 500 men on an attack of the small town and its U.S. Army outpost, manned by the 13th Cavalry. The Villistas took the town by surprise, but the American troops quickly recovered and fought back. The Mexicans retreated over the border. Seventeen Americans and over 100 Mexicans died during the raid.⁵⁴

Citizen outrage and natural instincts suggested that Villa himself be brought to justice for the attack. Public pronouncements from the Wilson administration indicated as much by announcing that they were sending Brigadier General John J. Pershing on a "punitive" expedition with the mission to capture or kill Villa.⁵⁵ However, for the Army, the Columbus raid and punitive expedition were very much a continuation of the previous attacks along the border, and therefore any response had to focus on border security. Stationing more troops in the border region and reacting to raids had not worked the year before, so they took a more direct approach.

After the Columbus raid, Secretary of War Newton Baker went to Army Chief of Staff General Hugh Scott to request "an expedition into Mexico

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to catch Villa.” Scott replied, “Mr. Secretary, do you want the United States to make war on one man? Suppose he should get on the train and go to Guatemala, Yucatan, or South America; are you going to go after him?” The general convinced Baker that a more realistic and useful goal was to capture or destroy Villa’s band.⁵⁶ General Funston came to a similar conclusion about what had to be done in response to Columbus: “Unless Villa is relentlessly pursued and his forces scattered he will continue raids . . . If we fritter away the whole command guarding towns, ranches and railroads it will accomplish nothing if he can find safe refuge across the line after every raid.”⁵⁷

The War Department’s March 1916 orders to Funston confirmed the Army’s concerns:

You will promptly organize an adequate military force of troops from your department under the command of Brigadier General John J. Pershing and will direct him to proceed promptly across the border in pursuit of the Mexican band which attacked the town of Columbus, New Mexico, and the troops there on the morning of the ninth. . . In any event the work of these troops will be regarded as finished as soon as Villa’s band or bands are known to be broken up.⁵⁸

Three days later, the War Department repeated the orders to Funston in order to avoid any confusion: “The President desires that your attention be especially and earnestly called to his determination that the expedition into Mexico is *limited* to the purposes originally stated, namely *the pursuit and dispersion of the band or bands that attacked Columbus, N.M.*”⁵⁹

The War Department did more than order the punitive expedition. The Villa raid gave the Army the opportunity to expand its tactics all along the border, and the Army meant to take advantage of that chance. The 10 March orders to Funston continued:

You will instruct the commanders of your troops on the border opposite of the state of Chihuahua and Sonora, or, roughly, within the field of possible operations by Villa and not under the control of the force of the de facto government, that they are authorized to use the same tactics of defense and pursuit in the event of similar raids across the border and into the United States.⁶⁰

The militarization of the frontier region had degenerated into direct conflict. American troops were crossing over the border on raids of their own.

On 15 March, Pershing led thousands of American troops into Mexico, beginning a campaign that would take him hundreds of miles through the state of Chihuahua in pursuit of Villa and his band.⁶¹ But Pershing’s was not the only crossborder raid of 1916. As American troops chased Villa across the Mexican countryside, the issue of border security became even more prominent in the minds of the Americans. They had reason to be concerned. De la Rosa, one of the leaders of the Plan of San Diego, believed that the trouble with Villa offered an opportunity to renew his efforts, so he began reconstituting his force. He and several other Mexican leaders reorganized the military wing of the Plan of San Diego. For a time, this force worked with elements of the Carranza government to threaten the United States with invasion as a method for driving out Pershing’s force. The Mexican government ultimately decided not to back this effort, but that did not stop a renewal of raids.⁶²

On 5 May 1916, a group of roughly 80 men raided the towns of Glenn Springs and Boquillas, Texas, destroying property and kidnapping 2 Americans. Funston quickly identified the threat as coming from the renewed efforts of the proponents of the Plan of San Diego and worried about the reaction of the civilian population: “I feel I should state frankly that a resumption of these raids marked



American Soldiers guarding some of Villa’s bandits who were caught in the mountains of Mexico, 27 April 1916, in a camp near Namiquipa, Mexico.

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with all the savage cruelties and barbarities of the lower border raids of last fall will rouse the people of that region to fury and cause them to cross the river in large numbers regardless of wishes of the Government and take drastic action.”⁶³ As they had the year before, Army commanders requested more troops to stop the raids and avert vigilantism. After the Glenn Springs raid, Generals Funston and Scott sent a telegram to the War Department:

We expect many attacks along the whole border similar to the latest attack in Big Bend Rio Grande.

Our line is thin and weak everywhere and inadequate to protect border anywhere if attacked in force . . . we think the border should at once be supported by at least 150,000 additional troops . . . In order to give some added protection to border points exposed to raids it is recommended militia of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona be called out at once.⁶⁴

The Wilson administration complied, sending much of the Regular Army to the southwest, and federalizing the Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas National Guards on 9 May 1916.⁶⁵

But in 1916, the United States did more than send additional troops to the border. Much to the surprise of the bandits who attacked Glenn Springs and Boquillas, the retreat across the Rio Grande did not give them refuge. Major George T. Langhorne, driving his own Cadillac, led 5 cavalry troops of the 8 and 14th Cavalry in the initial pursuit across the border, declaring “I am clear of red tape, and I know no Rio Grande.”⁶⁶ A few days later, Colonel Frederick W. Sibley led another unit after the Glenn Springs raiders. The Sibley and Langhorne force, dubbed by some “the little punitive expedition,” traveled more than 100 miles into Mexico, suffered no casualties, dispersed the bandits, rescued the captives, and even recovered some of the stolen property.⁶⁷

When a party of Mexicans attempted to burn bridges above Laredo on the night of 11-12 June, American forces tracked them over the river, killing three, including the leader.⁶⁸ Likewise, an attack on an Army unit at San Ignacio, Texas, on the night of 15 June led to a firefight that saw eight bandits killed, “and the rest pursued as they sought the sanctuary of Mexican territory.”⁶⁹ A similar course of events occurred in mid-June, when a group of

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the stolen property.**

Mexicans made an attack near San Benito, Texas. This time Colonel Robert Bullard led a mixed group of cavalry and infantry in automobiles over the border and dispersed the raiders.⁷⁰

The situation had become so tense that on 18 June, the Wilson administration federalized the rest of the country’s National Guard units and sent them to the border.⁷¹ These new troops were so untrained and unprepared that many of the regular officers thought they detracted from the mission of border security and made it nearly impossible to launch any more raids into Mexico.⁷² As these Guard units prepared for battle, some of the commanders on the border believed that they had a chance to launch a major campaign into Mexico and shut down the raids once and for all. Funston suggested to his superiors that the only way to truly stop the raids would be to have the Army move south of the border in large numbers to create a buffer area by occupying “strategic points.”⁷³

But just as the training began to take hold, orders came down prohibiting American forces from crossing the border.⁷⁴ The Wilson administration once again found itself questioning just how much time, energy, and resources it wanted to spend in Mexico with the war on in Europe. Likewise, Carranza really did not want to risk an open war with the United States that could lead to him being thrown from power. As Wilson began to limit Army reaction to raids, Carranza began to crack down on the raiders on his side of the border. He ordered his commanders on the border to cooperate with the Americans in stopping the raids. A good example of these new efforts could be seen in the aftermath of the San Benito raid. After Bullard and the Americans withdrew, the Mexican commander in the region, General Alfredo Ricaut, pursued the bandits, eventually capturing 40 men. With his plan

in tatters, De la Rosa went to Monterrey. There, the local authorities held him under a sort of house arrest, but refused to hand him over to the United States.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, by July, the Plan of San Diego was dead.

The issue of border security dominated the diplomatic discussions between the United States and Mexico, so much so that the withdrawal of the punitive expedition became predicated on the stabilization of the border. In July 1916, Secretary of State Lansing proposed a joint American-Mexican peace commission to settle the Mexican troubles. The commission was to come to agreements on all manner of issues, but among these issues, border security and stability clearly took precedence.⁷⁶ Indeed, the commission first met in September 1916 and spent the next four and a half months jockeying over questions of border passage, hot pursuit, and U.S.-Mexican cooperation in border security.⁷⁷ It was in this context that when Pershing's forces finally withdrew in January 1917 without capturing or killing Villa, the Americans declared the expedition a success. Secretary of War Newton Baker wrote in his 1917 annual report:

The expedition was in no sense punitive, but rather defensive. Its objective, of course, was the capture of Villa if that could be accomplished, but its real purpose was the extension of the power of the United States into a country disturbed beyond control of the constituted authorities of the Republic of Mexico, as a means of controlling lawless aggregations of bandits and preventing attacks by them across the international frontier. This purpose it fully and finally accomplished.⁷⁸

Chief of Staff General Hugh Scott agreed, "Pershing made a complete success in the accomplishment of his orders from the War Department point of view but the State Department, by putting out erroneous information, spoiled the effect in the minds of the public."⁷⁹

Perhaps this post-expedition insistence that the mission had always been to achieve border security was merely a justification for not capturing Villa. Pershing certainly felt that he could have done more if only the Wilson administration had given him more freedom to act.⁸⁰ But in light of the border disputes of 1915 and 1916 and the correspondence from Army commanders on the ground, there can be

little doubt that they viewed the pursuit of Mexican bandits across the Rio Grande as an essential tactic in the effort to preserve American border security. That tactic nearly led to open war.

Conclusions

Soon thereafter, the cross-border raids tapered off, and the situation stabilized. Some Army units stayed in the Southern Department—which was renamed the VIII Corps Area in 1920—but most returned to their stations across the United States. The next decades saw renewed tensions along the border from time to time, but nothing that rose to the levels of the 1910s. The United States and Mexico solved most of the rest of the border disputes of the 20th century by treaties. However, for that time in the 1910s when the Army played the key role in trying to provide stability and security along the border, the situation became very messy and nearly degenerated into war.

Obviously, the current situation along the United States-Mexico border is a far cry from the dark, violent days of the 1910s. There is no contemporary equivalent to the Plan of San Diego, and the Mexican government is far more stable than it was during the revolution. That said, there are important analogues, and the circumstances on the frontier are every bit as complex today as they were 90 years ago. In particular, by the 1980s, two problems had emerged: illegal immigration and the crossborder transport of illicit drugs. Mexican immigrants come across the border by the millions every year, using well-developed systems to bypass American border patrols. At the same time, and similar to the cross-border cattle rustlers of the 1910s, drug traffickers use this chaotic human exchange and the long, relatively open borders to send a flood of narcotics from Central and South America into the United States. The primary responsibility for border security is in the hands of the Border Patrol, run by Immigration and Naturalization Services. Like the Army in the 1910s, they are woefully undermanned, with not enough agents to cover all the miles of border.

What is more, much like the 1910s, those responsible for border security have to consider complicated ethnic politics and national-level diplomatic considerations. Rightly or wrongly, some Mexican American interest groups and civil rights activists take exception to policies that appear to target specific

ethnic groups for exclusion from the United States. National, state, and local American political leaders who depend on votes from such groups are wary of taking strong positions on border security.

In the 1990s, the United States, Canada, and Mexico joined together in the North American Free Trade Agreement, which further opened the borders within North America to business, and made it that much more difficult to exclude illegal immigrants and illicit narcotics. As a result of these trends, Border Patrol agents followed highly circumscribed rules of engagement to prevent outbreaks of violence that might upset the delicate political balance.⁸¹

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 complicated this already tendentious issue. All of the terrorists had come from overseas, and even though none had come from across the southern border, it was not too much of a stretch to imagine that the terrorists would eventually try to hide within the steady flow of illegal traffic from Mexico. For this reason, a number of private citizens pooled together to help aid the authorities in resisting illegal immigration. Calling themselves “Minutemen Civil Defense Corps,” they set up watch stations along the border to report sightings of illegal crossborder activities to the Border Patrol. Thus far, they have not engaged in any known acts of violence, but

they nevertheless have taken on the appearance of an anti-immigrant vigilante group.⁸²

In the summer of 2006, the pressure to deal with the southern border led to the deployment of 6,000 National Guard troops to the southern border in Operation Jump Start—a mission intended to support existing border authorities while the Border Patrol recruited thousands more agents to handle security on their own. American political and military leaders made clear their intent not to militarize the border or invade Mexico, and the soldiers operated under strict orders to observe and report but not engage with illegal immigration or narcotics smuggling.⁸³

Where then in this situation is the major area of concern for the military? The same place as it was in the 1910s: escalation. The border region is peopled with individuals of varying nationalities and national allegiances, and those allegiances can fuel intense emotions. Local authorities have their own agendas, which can be at cross purposes with the concerns of the national government, and volunteer law enforcement or vigilante groups might choose to act outside of local official policies. The presence of international boundaries means that local authorities must work with national-level diplomats to find solutions to disputes. The danger only grows when the military moves into the area.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, military forces on the border in support of the war against drugs got caught up in a few high-profile incidents when they used force against perceived and real threats. In one case of mistaken identity and misunderstood intentions, a Marine patrol killed an American citizen.⁸⁴ Since the 2006 deployment to the border, National Guard units have had to hold fire on several occasions, including when a group of armed bandits overran a military outpost in early 2007.⁸⁵ At the same time, there has been a significant increase in violence directed at Border Patrol agents—the men and women with whom the military works everyday.⁸⁶

The American military, even the more streamlined and nuanced force of today, is still an instrument of war. Its natural inclination is to use force, and it is unrealistic to expect that trained military forces



U.S. Army SGT Jim Greenhill

LTG H. Steven Blum, chief, National Guard Bureau, talks with Border Patrol agents during a visit to the U.S. border with Mexico near Columbus, New Mexico, on 29 November 2006.

will forever resist the urge to fight back to defend themselves and their friends.⁸⁷ Nor is it likely that state and national political leaders can or will allow their charges to be attacked perpetually without allowing some sort of response. When the military is involved, there is a great temptation to use force, as everyone discovered in the 1910s. But as everyone also discovered in that tumultuous decade, the use of force along the border can have dramatic and very negative effects.

What to do? The decision to restrain the National Guard has by and large worked to prevent escalation on the border in the short term. But it is predicated on a decisive increase in Border Patrol agents in

the near future. If that happens, then the military can withdraw. But if it does not happen, and the chances look somewhat dim, then American policy-makers must make a choice.⁸⁸ Either the military must be empowered to enforce border security by all means available, which will in effect militarize the border, or the military must be withdrawn to allow the undermanned Border Patrol and local authorities to handle the job. The toothless military presence on the border cannot last forever. The U.S. military has enough on its plate fighting the nation's conventional and unconventional wars; it cannot and must not become a permanent southern border neighborhood watch association. **MR**

NOTES

1. On the Mexican Revolution, see Robert E. Quirk, *The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960); and Alan Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

2. John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 29-34.

3. War Department, General Orders No. 9, 6 February, 1913, Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 31-34.

4. Robert E. Quirk, *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962); Frederick S. Calhoun, *Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy* (OH: Kent State University Press, 1986), 34-51.

5. Huerta fled to Europe and later tried to return to Mexico through the United States. He failed in these efforts and died of illness in 1916. Carranza's title at this point was "First Chief of the Constitutionalists." George J. Rausch, "The Exile and Death of Victoriano Huerta," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 42 (May 1962): 133-51; and Allen Gerlach, "Conditions Along the Border—1915: The Plan of San Diego," *New Mexico Historical Review*, 43 (July 1968), 195-98.

6. Wilson once described Carranza as "trying and pig-headed." Quoted in Kendrick A. Clements, "Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Policy, 1913-15," *Diplomatic History*, 4 (Spring 1980): 133. Further evidence of Wilson's ambivalence toward the Mexican leadership can be found in his public statement of 2 June 1915 in *Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS]—1915* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1924), 694-95.

7. On diplomacy between the United States and Mexico in this period, see Robert Freeman Smith, *The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 1-42; P. Edward Haley, *Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1970); Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), 107-32; Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), 232-66, 456-94; Clements, "Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Policy," 113-36; Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, The United States, and the Mexican Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 3-300; and Friedrich Katz, *The Life and Times of Pancho Villa* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 501-2.

8. Robert J. Rosenbaum, *Mexicano Resistance in the Southwest* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 14.

9. Most studies of Mexican Americans in the border states tend to emphasize racial discrimination on the part of Anglo Americans as a key aspect in encouraging Mexican American violent resistance, including the "Plan of San Diego." See for example, *Ibid.*, 18-157; Juan Gomez-Q, "Plan of San Diego Reviewed," in *Chicano: The Evolution of a People*, ed. Renato Rosaldo, et al. (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1973), 123-27; and David Montejano, *Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 117-25. For a discussion of the role of African Americans in the racial issues of the border during the Mexican Revolution, see James N. Leiker, *Racial Borders: Black Soldiers Along the Rio Grande* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 146-71.

10. Charles H. Harris and Louis R. Sadler, *The Texas Rangers and the Mexican Revolution: The Bloodiest Decade, 1910-1920* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004), 196.

11. Reproductions and descriptions of the plan can be found in many places. James A. Sandos, *Rebellion in the Borderlands: Anarchism and the Plan of San Diego, 1901-1923* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 79-84; Don M. Coerver and Linda B. Hall, *Texas and the Mexican Revolution* (San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press, 1984), 85-87; Charles H. Harris and Louis R. Sadler, "The Plan of San Diego and the Mexican-United States War Crisis of 1916: A Reexamination," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 58 (August 1978): 381-408; Harris and Sadler, *Texas Rangers*, 210-21; James A. Sandos, "The Plan of San Diego: War and Diplomacy on the Texas Border, 1915-1916," *Arizona and the West*, 14 (Spring

1972): 5-24; William M. Hager, "The Plan of San Diego: Unrest on the Texas Border in 1915," *Arizona and the West*, 5 (Winter 1963): 327-36. Allen Gerlach argues that the plan was part of a larger attempt to return Huerta to power in "Conditions Along the Border," 198-99.

12. Clarence C. Clendenen, *Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars* (London: Macmillan, 1969), 180-81.

13. Sandos, "Plan of San Diego," 10, fn. 9.

14. Sandos, *Rebellion in the Borderlands*, 188, fn. 37.

15. *Ibid.*, 87-94.

16. Harris and Sadler, *Texas Rangers*, 250.

17. Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids in the Lower Rio Grande Valley-1915," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, 57 (Jan 1954): 291-92.

18. Harris and Sadler, *Texas Rangers*, 261.

19. *Ibid.*, 263-67; Sandos, *Rebellion in the Borderlands*, 90-91.

20. Cumberland, "Border Raids," 286-88.

21. Harris and Sadler, "Plan of San Diego," 387-88.

22. Harris and Sadler, *Texas Rangers*, 268.

23. Funston to War Department, 10 August 1915, *FRUS—1915*, 803.

24. James Parker, *The Old Army: Memories, 1872-1918* (Philadelphia: Dorrance Publishing Company, 1929), 419; Allan R. Millett, *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1975), 276.

25. *Ibid.*, 419.

26. Coerver and Hall, *Texas and the Mexican Revolution*, 88.

27. Millett, *The General*, 279. For more on the various departments and districts of the era, see *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, Volume 3, Part 2: Zone of the Interior: Territorial Departments, Tactical Divisions* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988).

28. Funston to Secretary of War, 30 August 1915, *FRUS—1915*, 806.

29. Walter Prescott Webb, *The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), 486.

30. Harris and Sadler, "Plan of San Diego," 391.

31. Coerver and Hall, *Texas and the Mexican Revolution*, 106.

32. Quoted in Harris and Sadler, "Plan of San Diego," 391-92.

33. Cumberland, "Border Raids," 302-11; Millett, *The General*, 278-79. It should be noted that some of the initial attacks in the summer of 1915 made use of friendly Mexican Americans living in Texas to attack targets over 70 miles north of the border. In late August, September, and October, after the local authorities and citizenry went on the rampage in their efforts to clear the valley of potential bandits, nearly all of the attacks occurred within a few miles of the border. The adherents to the Plan of San Diego needed aid north of the border if they wanted to attack in depth and sustain their efforts. The hostile population in Texas quickly eliminated such aid. Funston reported in September 1915, "It is well established that heretofore many individuals comprising bandit bands who have given us so much trouble have been made up of persons crossing from [the] Mexican side and getting arms from concealed stores on [the] American side and then starting on prearranged raids. When pursued and hard pressed either by sheriffs' posses, rangers, or soldiers, the bands have broken up and recrossed into Mexico." McCain to Lansing, 13 September 1915, *FRUS—1915*, 810-11.

34. Harris and Sadler, *Texas Rangers*, 249.

35. Clendenen, *Blood on the Border*, 183; Breckinridge to Bryan, 24 March 1915, *FRUS—1915*, 794.

36. Harris and Sadler, *Texas Rangers*, 249-50.

37. Millett, *The General*, 275-76. See also Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing*, vol. 1 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 584; and Frederick Palmer, *Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker H. Bliss* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1934), 101-19.

38. Parker, *Old Army*, 418-19.

39. Breckinridge to Funston, 24 July 1915, *FRUS—1915*, 800.

40. Lansing to Johnson, 28 August 1915, *FRUS—1915*, 804; Lansing to Silliman, 28 August 1915, *FRUS—1915*, 805; Pugh to Lansing, 28-29 August 1915, *FRUS—1915*, 805-6; Cumberland, "Border Raids," 299.
41. *Ibid.*, 296-99; Harris and Sadler, "Plan of San Diego," 389.
42. Sandos, "Plan of San Diego," 17; Harris and Sadler, *Texas Rangers*, 278-87; Cumberland, "Border Raids," 298-99.
43. "Testimony of John I. Kleiber," 23 January 1920, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Investigation of Mexican Affairs* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1920); Sandos, *Rebellion in the Borderlands*, 101-5; Harris and Sadler, *Texas Rangers*, 292-93.
44. Quoted in Harris and Sadler, *Texas Rangers*, 293; Cumberland, "Border Raids," 304.
45. Cumberland, "Border Raids," 305.
46. Quoted in Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 134; (Emphasis in original).
47. Katz, *Secret War*, 50-350; Hager, "Plan of San Diego," 331-33; Gerlach, "Conditions Along the Border," 196-201; Sandos, "Plan of San Diego," 11-12; and James A. Sandos, "German Involvement in Northern Mexico, 1915-1916: A New Look at the Columbus Raid," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 50 (February 1970): 70-88. The seriousness of German interference in Mexico would become more widely known in early 1917, when German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann sent his famous telegram to the German representative in Mexico City encouraging the Mexicans to attack the American southwest in the event of open war between the United States and Germany. Zimmermann sent the telegram under the assumption that Germany's declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare against shipping to the Allied powers would cause the United States to enter the war. British intelligence intercepted and decoded the telegram, and then maneuvered to make its existence known to the Americans. The Zimmermann telegram helped spur the United States to war. Barbara Tuchman, *The Zimmermann Telegram* (New York: Viking Press, 1958); Katz, *Secret War*, 350-83.
48. Link, *Woodrow Wilson: Struggle for Neutrality*, 629-44; Correspondence in *Foreign Relations of the United States—The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, vol. 2 (Washington DC: GPO, 1940), 528-54.
49. Hager, "Plan of San Diego," 336.
50. Knight, *Mexican Revolution*, vol. 2, 344; Sandos, "Plan of San Diego," 16-17.
51. A solid popular account of these affairs is John S.D. Eisenhower, *Intervention!: The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993).
52. On Villa's turn against the United States, see Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 499-541, and Clarence C. Clendenen, *The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), 192-236.
53. The most common interpretation, especially from the first historians, was that Villa acted out of revenge for the American recognition of Carranza. Others have argued that the raid was a foraging expedition that took aim at a few individuals who Villa believed had wronged him. The most prominent Villa biographer maintains that Villa acted to preserve Mexico's independence because he mistakenly believed that Carranza had made a deal with the Wilson administration that surrendered Mexican autonomy to the United States. Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 551-64, 884 fn. 13; Friedrich Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus, New Mexico," *American Historical Review*, 83 (February 1978): 101-30. At least one historian makes the claim that German agents played a key role in instigating the Columbus raid and punitive expedition. Sandos, "German Involvement," 79-88.
54. Eisenhower, *Intervention*, 217-27; Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 564-66; Clendenen, *Blood on the Border*, 196-210; Joseph A. Stout, *Border Conflict: Villistas, Carrancistas and the Punitive Expedition, 1915-1920* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University, 1999)33-44.
55. Hugh L. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier* (New York: Century, 1928), 519-20.
56. *Ibid.*
57. Funston to Adjutant General, 10 March 1916, *FRUS—1916*, 482-83; Calhoun, *Power and Principle*, 53.
58. Quoted in Scott, *Some Memories*, 520-21.
59. Quoted in James A. Sandos, "Pancho Villa and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Diplomacy Reconsidered," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 13 (November 1981): 301, [emphasis in original].
60. Quoted in Scott, *Some Memories*, 520-21.
61. There is an extensive literature on the "punitive expedition." See, for example, John J. Pershing, "Punitive Expedition Report," Colonia Dublan, Mexico, 10 October 1916; Donald Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 217-79; Vandiver, *Black Jack*, vol. 2, 604-68; Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 199-208; Haldeen Braddy, *Pershing's Mission to Mexico* (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1973); Herbert Mason, *The Great Pursuit* (New York: Random House, 1970); Roger G. Miller, *A Preliminary to War: The 1st Aero Squadron and the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916* (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2003); Jeff Jore, "Pershing's Mission in Mexico: Logistics and Preparation for War in Europe," *Military Affairs*, 52 (July 1988): 117-21; and Mitchell Yockelson, "The United States Armed Forces and the Mexican Punitive Expedition," 2 Parts, *Prologue*, 29 (Fall 1997 and Winter 1997).
62. Harris and Sadler, "Plan of San Diego," 394-98.
63. Funston to Secretary of War, 7 June 1916, *FRUS—1916*, 568-69.
64. Funston and Scott to Secretary of War, 8 May 1916, *FRUS—1917*, 543-44.
65. United States War Department, *Annual Report—1916*, vol. 1, 11.
66. Quoted in Coerver and Hall, *Texas and the Mexican Revolution*, 100.
67. Sandos, "Plan of San Diego," 21; Coerver and Hall, *Texas and the Mexican Revolution*, 100; Ronnie C. Tyler, "The Little Punitive Expedition in the Big Bend," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, 78 (January 1975), 271-91; Linda B. Hall and Don M. Coerver, *Revolution on the Border: The United States and Mexico, 1910-1920* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), 71-74; Funston to Secretary of War, 7 May 1916, *FRUS—1916*, 542.
68. See correspondence in *FRUS—1916*, 573-75.
69. Harris and Sadler, "Plan of San Diego," 399.
70. Parker, *Old Army*, 424-25; Millett, *The General*, 284; Sandos, "Plan of San Diego," 22-23; Stout, *Border Conflict*, 81-83; Harris and Sadler, "Plan of San Diego," 399-400.
71. United States War Department, *Annual Report—1916*, vol. 1, 11-12.
72. Millett, *The General*, 285-90.
73. Coerver and Hall, *Texas and the Mexican Revolution*, 100-1.
74. Parker, *Old Army*, 425-29.
75. *Ibid.*, 424-25; Millett, *The General*, 284; Sandos, "Plan of San Diego," 22-23; Stout, *Border Conflict*, 81-83; Harris and Sadler, "Plan of San Diego," 399-402.
76. Lansing to Wilson, 3 July 1916, *FRUS—Lansing Papers*, vol. 2, 560-62. See also "Correspondence Between Mexico and the United States Regarding the American Punitive Expedition, 1916," *American Journal of International Law*, 10 (July 1916), 179-225.
77. American Commissioners to the Secretary of State, 26 April 1917, *Foreign Relations of the United States—1917* (Washington DC: GPO, 1926), 916-38.
78. Quoted in Sandos, "Pancho Villa and American Security," 310. Baker repeated the theme on later occasions, telling an audience at one point he was glad not to capture Villa because Pershing's force in Mexico deterred major attacks on the border. Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 266.
79. Scott, *Some Memories*, 521.
80. Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 267-69.
81. Matt M. Matthews, *The U.S. Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective*, Long War Series Occasional Paper 22 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 73-84; Graham H. Turbiville, "US-Mexican Border Security: Civil-Military Cooperation," *Military Review*, 89 (July-August 1999): 29-39; and Malia Politzer, "It's Our Job to Stop That Dream," *Reason*, 38 (April 2007): 40-49.
82. Jim Gilchrist and Jerome Corsi, *Minutemen: The Battle to Secure America's Borders* (Los Angeles, CA: World Ahead Publishing, 2006); Solana Larsen, "The Anti-Immigration Movement: From Shovels to Suits," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 40 (May-June 2007): 14; and Joseph Lelyveld, "The Border Dividing Arizona," *New York Times Magazine*, 14 October 2006, 40.
83. Dennis Steele, "Operation Jump Start: National Guard Aids Border Patrol Mission," *Army* (November 2006): 16-37; Stew Magnuson, "On the Line," *National Defense*, 92 (August 2007): 60-66; Rene Romo, "Guardsmen Deploy to Border," *Albuquerque Journal*, 11 June 2006, B1; John W. Gonzalez, "General Says Guard Will Look, Not Shoot," *Knight Ridder Tribune News*, 16 June 2006, 1; Susan Ferriss, "Guard's Border Role Support, Not Pursuit: U.S. Patrol has Enforcement Duty," *Knight Ridder Tribune News*, 20 July 2006, 1; and Daniel B. Wood, "New Troops at US Border," *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 July 2006, 1.
84. Matthews, *U.S. Army on the Mexican Border*, 80.
85. Jerry Seper, "Troops Flee from Border Outpost," *Washington Times*, 6 January 2007, A01; Jerry Seper, "A New Role for the Undermanned Border Patrol; Unarmed National Guardsmen get a 'Nanny Patrol,'" *Washington Times*, 17 August 2006, A01.
86. Faye Bowers, "On Tighter US Border with Mexico, Violence Rises," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 April 2007, 1; Faye Bowers, "US Fights Border-Crime Epidemic," *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 April 2007, 2; Daniel Gilbert, "Shooting Case has Border Agents on Edge," *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 June 2007, 3; Richard A. Serrano, "Drug War Fuels Border Violence," *Seattle Times*, 20 August 2007, A3; Jerry Seper, "Lawmen Under Siege along Mexico Border," *Washington Times*, 15 November 2007, A1; Jerry Seper, "Border Agents Assaulted at Unprecedented Rate," *Washington Times*, 3 January 2008, A4; and R. Cort Kirkwood, "Border Town Violence," *New American*, 22 (7 August 2006): 25-28.
87. On the tedium of the Guard's mission, and some local anger over that mission, see John W. Gonzalez, "Guardsmen's Behavior Called Isolated Incident," *Knight Ridder Tribune News*, 17 September 2006, 1; and Jerry Seper, "Texas Sheriffs Slam Inaction on Border," *Washington Times*, 26 September 2006, A04.
88. On the recruitment efforts, see Howard Fischer, "Bidding War is On for Border Agents," *Arizona Daily Star*, 17 May 2007, A1, and Meg Jones, "At the Border, A Second Front," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, 4 March 2007, A1. There has been an ongoing push from state leaders to extend Operation Jump Start. See "Gov. Schwarzenegger Calls for Extension of Operation Jump Start," *US Fed News Service*, 1 February 2008; Eric Rosenberg, "National Guard Pulls Border Troops," *Beaumont Enterprise*, 20 September 2007, A5; Jerry Seper, "Guard Troop Pulled Back from Border," *Washington Times*, 9 August 2007, A1; Howard Fischer, "Gov.: Leave Guard on Border," *Arizona Daily Star*, 4 August 2007, A1; "Rep. Boozman Announces His Support of Expanding Operation Jump Start," *US Fed News Service*, 27 February 2007; and John W. Gonzalez, "Guard Will Keep Duty on Borders," *Knight Ridder Tribune News*, 10 November 2006, 1.